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Case studieS Summary : Dakar
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Dakar Case Study
Title: Dakar, Senegal Experience in Bus Reform
Author: Xavier Godard
Date: January 2005
Download the case study (MS Word 593KB)

Summary

Political context
Public transport system structure and organization
Perceived problems
Main lessons

 

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Political context
An organizing authority (CETUD) for urban transport in Dakar Region and other medium size cities in Senegal was created in 1997, primarily to resolve problems of dispersal of jurisdiction between the various central and local institutions, and to improve coordination of decisions on urban transport policy, with the vital participation of the local authorities.

CETUD’s role is to organize and regulate supply and demand of urban public transport in order to create a favorable economic environment for the operators and to promote the emergence of sound, durable competition in accordance with the public transport policy defined by the state for the Dakar region. This includes determining the routes to be served, and service capacities and fares, and securing the operation of these routes by contracting with bus operators.

Local governments are not usually involved in urban transport as this is considered to be the task of the state — the law on decentralization excludes urban transport, although the communes have been involved in the Board of CETUD, while the commune of Dakar would like to develop a LRT project.

One of CETUD’s first projects was the privatization of SOTRAC, a mixed (public and private) enterprise bus company, with a status of private enterprise. This was not achieved in the stipulated time period and the anticipated dissolution of the company led to problems. Potential international partners were reluctant to participate, fearing competition from small local operators.

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Public transport system structure and organization
Conventional bus services are currently operated by Dakar Dem Dikk (DDD), a company created in 2000 by the state and private local interests with a fleet of second hand vehicles, with the intention to purchase additional new buses. But the situation deteriorated in 2003 and 2004 so that very few vehicles were operated daily — officially 45 vehicles for public transport and 15 vehicles for specialized transport. For 2005, 410 new buses have been ordered.

New buses are purchased by the Senegalese State, under interstate agreements with Sweden and India, and leased to DDD on favorable terms. DDD has two depots with workshops and requires two other depots for the new buses to be acquired in 2005.

There are around 2,500 to 4,000 smaller buses, known as cars rapides, with between 25 and 40 seats. New vehicles are scheduled to appear in 2005 under a fleet renewal program funded by the World Bank.

The cars rapides are not managed by their owners. The driver, who pays the owner a fixed sum of money daily, is responsible for the operation of the vehicle, which can be allocated to a route and a terminal managed by the drivers’ unions. Terminal controllers may suggest to the drivers what is the best route depending to the state of the demand and the period in the day, and thus play a key role in the management of the system.

The political power of unions is considered to be strong as demonstrated during a strike in January 2005, which was organized by one of the two unions of drivers and involved all cars rapides, and was reported to have blocked Dakar for a full day.

All terminals are operated by drivers’ unions with the exception of two important terminals in the center which are operated by a private firm, which is also franchised to manage parking in the center of Dakar.

In addition to these modes there are shared taxis and metered individual taxis (including illegal taxis), and an urban railway.

There are officially 23 lines operated by DDD but in 2002 and 2003 only 17 lines were operated. Cars rapides operators tend to operate routes in a flexible manner and there is no record of the routes actually operated.

Licenses for cars rapides are issued by the Director of Land Transport, subject to a mechanical inspection of the vehicle, and registration of the owner as a transporter. Under a new scheme, CETUD will specify the number of licenses required and the routes allocated to transporters, and it will also prepare the forms of license so that the Director of Land Transport will have only to countersign the decision.

Taxi licenses are issued by the Governor of Dakar Region.

Drivers’ licenses are issued by the Ministry of Transport. Under a new scheme introduced in 1999, a public transport driver must participate in a training session confirmed by a certificate, which will be required for each driver engaged in the operation of the new minibuses. This training program will be pursued as part of the minibus renewal program.

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Perceived problems
The reforms summarized above have not been fully implemented.

The public transport service is inadequate and is deteriorating from year-to-year. It is difficult to move in Dakar by public or private transport because of the congestion encountered on the main roads, especially in the central city area.

The majority of cars rapides are concentrated on the routes from periphery to Dakar center, and the supply is insufficient on the other routes. Supply is also judged insufficient in off-peak periods.

The capacity provided by the DDD is very low, as very few vehicles are operated daily, resulting in very low and irregular frequencies.

The quality of service is judged as bad by many observers. In particular, the service provided by the cars rapides is characterized by old vehicles, bad maintenance, polluting vehicles, poor safety standards, drivers stopping anywhere on the street to pick up passengers, intimidation by controllers, the practice of cutting routes, obliging users to pay two or three times the fare for one trip, poor route information, long waiting times, vehicles turning short of their stated destinations, and risk of robbery inside the vehicles.

There are many causes of these problems, including:

  • Insufficient political willingness to implement the decisions regarding organization of the sector
  • Problems of communication between owners, drivers and controllers (despite the existence of unions that should facilitate communication)
  • Reluctance on the part of policymakers to implement measures that may threaten people’s livelihoods in a context of low employment levels
  • Poor enforcement of driving standards, exacerbated by corruption
  • The reforms may also be overly-ambitious. A formal and rigid scheme has been designed and planned to be applied to informal and flexible practices, and an intermediate reform, which could be implemented effectively, is probably required as an initial step.

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    Main lessons
    Reform takes a long time.

    A clear and strong political willingness for reform, and a clear direction of reform on the key factors, are essential.

    The insistence on formal goals, such as privatization, imposed by the World Bank can result in inefficiency.

    Reform does not work if it is too dependent on formal procedures, without development of real expertise.

    Even if initial attempts to reform are unsuccessful, valuable experience will have been gained that should be exploited in subsequent reform programs.

       

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